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Abstract
In our daily lives, we rely on the proper functioning of supply networks, from power grids to
water transmission systems. A single failure in these critical infrastructures can lead to a complete
collapse through a cascading failure mechanism. Counteracting strategies are thus heavily sought
after. In this article, we introduce a general framework to analyse the spreading of failures in
complex networks and demonstrate that both weak and strong connections can be used to contain
damages. We rigorously prove the existence of certain subgraphs, called network isolators, that
can completely inhibit any failure spreading, and we show how to create such isolators in synthetic
and real-world networks. The addition of selected links can thus prevent large scale outages as
demonstrated for power transmission grids.
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Complex networked systems are subject to external perturbations, damages or attacks
with potentially catastrophic consequences [1, 2]. The loss of even a single edge can cause
a blackout in a power grid [3, 4], the dieback of a biological network [5], or the collapse of
an entire ecological network [6]. It is thus essential to understand how the structure of a
network determines its response to perturbations and its global resilience [7–11]. Here, we
propose a general framework to model the redistribution of flows in a complex network that
follows a small and local failure, and we suggest novel and more efficient strategies to improve
network resilience. Our findings reveal that propagation of damages can counterintuitively
be better limited by adding selected links instead of removing links and can turn very useful
to construct more robust networks or to improve existing ones.
The division of a network into weakly coupled parts provides the most intuitive method
to inhibit the spreading of failures, thus improving system resilience [12–15]. An example is
shown in Fig. 1(a) for an elementary supply network with two weakly connected modules.
The response to an edge failure is strong locally, but it is reduced in the other module of the
network which has only few links to the part where the failure happened. A similar effect
is observed in a real-world case, the Scandinavian power grid in Fig. 1(d). The study of
community structures in both natural and man-made systems is an integral part of network
science: a variety of methods has been developed to define and identify the weakly connected
modules of a network [16–18], and the important role of community structures in network
dynamics is today well recognised.
Limiting connectivity for the sake of additional security is, however, not always desirable.
For instance, microgrid concepts and intentional islanding are heavily discussed in energy
systems research [21, 22], but the overall demand for electric power transmission actually
increases [23, 24]. Other methods to contain perturbations or damages in complex networks
are thus needed. Indeed, an exceptionally strong inter-connectivity between two modules can
also suppress failure spreading as shown in Fig. 1(b,e). Notably, a strong inter-connectivity
can be realised in different ways. In the random network example in Fig. 1(b), a high number
of links connects a subset of nodes of the two modules. In real vascular networks of leafs,
the suppression of failure spreading occurs naturally because the central vein between the
left and right parts has an exceptionally large capacity (Fig. 1(e), cf. also [25]).
Remarkably, failure spreading can be completely stopped by certain subgraphs which we
refer to as network isolators in the following, an example being shown in Fig. 1(c). The
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Figure 1. Different network structures inhibit the spreading of failures in complex
networks. We simulate the impact of a single failing link (red) for different network structures;
resulting flow changes are colour coded. (a,b) Both a weak and a strong inter-connectivity can
suppress the spreading of failures between two modules of a complex network. (c) Failure spreading
is prevented completely by a network isolator (blue shading); flow changes on the grey links are
exactly zero. (d) The Scandinavian powergrid consists of three weakly connected modules which
suppresses failure spreading between the modules [19]. (e) The vascular network of a Bursera
hollickii leaf contains a strong central vein [20], which suppresses failure spreading between the
two sides of the leaf. (f) Same as in (d) but with the addition of two links (blue shading) to create
a network isolator.
failure of an edge in the right part of the network does not affect the flows in the left part at
all. Real world networks can be made perfectly resistant to failure propagation by the ad-
hoc addition of few links to create network isolators, as demonstrated for the Scandinavian
power grid in Fig. 1(f) consisting of three weakly coupled modules. The suppression of
failure spreading is readily generalised to networks with more than two modules [26].
Our results are based on a general framework that allows a theoretical analysis of the
interplay of network connectivity and robustness in the context of supply or transportation
networks. Many such systems can in fact be modelled by linear flow networks where the
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flow over an edge (i, j) depends linearly on the gradient of a potential function across the
edge, Fi→j = Kij · (ϑi − ϑj). In particular, this description applies to power transmission
grids [27], where F is the real power flow, ϑi denotes the nodal voltage phase angle and Kij
is given by the line susceptance, and to vascular networks [28, 29], where F is the flow of
water or nutrients, ϑi is the local pressure and Kij the edge’s capacity (see Supplemental
Material [26]). The generalisation to nonlinear systems will be discussed below. Further-
more, equivalent problems arise in the linearisation of general diffusively coupled networks
of dynamical systems around an equilibrium or limit cycle [30].
The impact of a damage in linear flow networks can be calculated analytically. Assume
that an edge ` = (r, s) fails, and summarise the response at all nodes i = 1, . . . , N by the
vector of changes ∆~ϑ = (∆ϑ1, . . . ,∆ϑN)
>. One then finds [26]
L∆~ϑ = q`~ν`, (1)
where L is the Laplacian matrix of the weighted network, ~ν` is a vector with +1 at position
r and −1 at position s, and q` = 1 −Krs~ν>` L−1~ν` is a source strength [31]. We thus find
that the response of a network to failures is essentially determined by the Laplacian L. This
matrix incorporates the network structure and is defined as follows;
Lij =

−Kij if i is connected to j,∑
(i,k)∈E(G)Kik if i = j,
0 otherwise.
(2)
Notably, the Laplacian matrix is also useful to infer the large scale connectivity and the
community structure of a given network [32].
To quantify the effect of connectivity on failure spreading, we have studied the impact of
different failures in a variety of synthetic networks as well as in several real-world networks.
For a given initial failure of an edge `, we compute the flow changes ∆Fi→j = Kij ·(∆ϑi−∆ϑj)
for all edges (i, j) in a given subgraph G′ of the network. Furthermore, we must take into
account that the impact of a failure generally decreases with distance [31, 33, 34]. As an
overall measure of the impact of a failure we thus consider the expression 〈|∆Fi→j|〉(i,j)∈G
′
d ,
which gives the magnitude of flow changes averaged over all edges (i, j) ∈ G′ at a given
distance d to the edge `. The prime question is now whether the impact differs substantially
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Figure 2. Effectiveness and robustness of shielding network structures. (a,b) Adjacency
matrices for the graphs shown in Fig. 1(a,b). Two random graphs G(30, 0.4) are inter-connected via
a fraction c of their nodes chosen at random, and links are added with probability µ, interpolating
between weak (a) or strong (b) inter-connectivity. (c) Adjacency matrix for the 6-regular graph
shown in Fig. 1(c) containing a network isolator. (d) The average ratio of flow changes R(`) in the
two components (Eq. 3) is strongly suppressed for both high and low inter-connectivity µ. The blue
line represents the median value over all distances and the shaded region indicates the 0.25- and
0.75-quantiles. (e) The ratio of flow changes R vanishes for a perfect network isolator described by
the condition ξ(A12) = 0 and increases algebraically with coherence parameter ξ when perturbed.
between the communities or moduli of a network. We thus plot the ratio
R(`, d) =
〈|∆Fi→j|〉(i,j)∈Od
〈|∆Fi→j|〉(i,j)∈Sd
. (3)
between the remote part of the network G′ = O and the part G′ = S containing the failing
edge `. If this ratio approaches or reaches zero, this is indicative of a very strong suppression
of failure spreading into the other part of the network.
To study how the impact of failure spreading depends on the network structure, we
considered synthetic graphs obtained by connecting two Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) random graphs to
each other at preselected, randomly chosen vertices with a tunable probability µ ∈ [0, 1] [26,
35]. The resulting graphs have a connectivity structure ranging from two weakly connected
communities for low values of µ shown in Figure 1(a) to strongly connected parts shown
in panel (b). In the limit µ = 1, the two modules are connected via a complete bipartite
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Figure 3. Network isolators can contain cascading failures in power grids. (a) Line
loading (colour code) on the Scandinavian grid in units relative to maximal loading before the
initial failure of a single line (coloured red). (b) The initial failure results in a cascade of overloads
(red coloured lines) until the grid disconnects into several parts. (c) Magnification of the grid
structure in Eastern Norway. A small modification of the grid enables a network isolator. (d)
Introducing the network isolator completely suppresses the spreading of failures from Western
Norway to the rest of the grid thus inhibiting the cascade observed in (b).
graph as shown in Fig. 1(c). This is a possible realization of a network isolator, since it
completely suppresses flow changes as we will explain in the following. The corresponding
adjacency matrices clearly indicate the connectivity structure, revealing the strong or weak
coupling between the two modules of the networks (Fig. 2(a,b,c)). Remarkably, evaluating
the quantity R(`), obtained by averaging the ratio over flow changes R(`, d) over all distances
d for a specific trigger link `, for a varying connectivity structure tuned by µ, we find that
the spreading of failures is largely suppressed for both weak and strong connectivity between
the two modules as shown in Fig. 2(d). Distance plays a minor role for the ratio of flow
changes R(d) as illustrated in a separate Figure in the Supplemental Material [26].
Network symmetries are known to play an important role for the dynamics and syn-
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chronisability of a network [36–38]. Network isolators as a specific connectivity structure
completely inhibit the spreading of failures from one network module to another. They man-
ifest also as particular, symmetric patterns in the region of the adjacency matrix describing
the connectivity between the two parts of the network as we have seen in Fig. 2(c). They are
characterised by the following theorem, which we prove in the Supplemental Material [26]
Theorem 1. Consider a linear flow network composed of two modules 1,2 and let A12
denote the weighted adjacency matrix of the mutual connections. An edge failure in one
module does not affect the flows in the other module if rank(A12) = 1. For unweighted
networks this criterion is fulfilled if A12 describes a complete bipartite graph.
Note that, while network isolators prevent failure spreading, we found that they do not
influence network controllability [26].
Since most real world examples of networks do not contain perfect network isolators,
we have studied the robustness of a network isolator against modifications of the topology.
Starting from a unit rank matrix, we perturb the adjacency matrix A12 iteratively. In each
step we choose one of the matrix columns ~ai, i = 1, . . . ,m at random and perturb it according
to ~a′i = ~ai+~e‖~ai‖. The elements of the perturbation vector ~e are chosen uniformly at random
from the interval [−β, β], where β is a small parameter, here β = 0.05. The deviation of the
perturbed matrix A12 from a unit rank matrix is quantified using its coherence statistics [39],
ξ(A12) = 1−min
i,j
〈~ai,~aj〉
‖~ai‖‖~aj‖ . (4)
The performance of the isolator is then measured by calculating the ratio of flow changes
R, which is obtained from R(`, d) by averaging over all possible trigger links and distances.
A perfect isolator is characterised by ξ(A12) = 0 and enables a complete containment of
failure spreading such that R = 0. For perturbed isolators, we find that R increases approx-
imately algebraically with ξ(A12), see Fig. 2(e). Hence, the isolation effect persists for small
perturbations, albeit with reduced efficiency.
Perfect network isolators can be easily constructed to improve the resilience of complex
networked systems. As a practical example we show an application to electric power grids,
where large scale blackouts are typically triggered by the outage of a single transmission
element which leads to a cascade of failures [3, 40]. We demonstrate the impact of network
isolators against cascading failures in the case of the Scandinavian grid. In the original grid
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Figure 4. Different ways of constructing isolators and their effects in full non-linear AC
load flow. (a) to (d) Alternative methods of creating an isolator in a given network. We show the
network structure before (top left) and after (top right) the addition of a network isolator, as well
as corresponding adjacency matrices (bottom) with the different shades of blue representing the
capacity Kij of the respective edge. A lower prior connectivity simplifies the creation of isolators as
measured by the vertex cut (a) or edge cut (b,c,d) which is visible in the adjacency matrix (entries
colored red). The creation of network isolators results in characteristic patterns in the adjacency
matrix in terms of the capacities of the isolator edges (shades of blue). (e) An initially failing link
with unit flow (red) in the British grid results in changes of real power flow (colour code) throughout
the whole network, as obtained by computing a non-linear full AC power flow [19, 26]. (f,g) After
introducing a network isolator based on the strategy presented in panel (a), failure spreading is
perfectly inhibited in the linear power flow approximation, and still significantly reduced in the
non-linear full AC load flow. (h) Median absolute flow changes are significantly lower in the upper
module of the grid shielded by the isolator (light blue, straight line) compared to the situation
before introducing the isolator (light blue, dotted line), whereas flow changes in the lower module
are almost the same (dark blue lines).
layout, failure spreading between different areas of the grid is reduced due to the presence
of only few connections between different areas of the network – but it is possible. A failure
in one area can thus spread to other areas and cause a global cascade, as demonstrated in
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Figure 3(a,b) for a cascade emerging in Western Norway. This spreading may in principle
be prevented by decoupling different areas of the grid, but this is highly undesired. In
fact, future energy systems will require more connectivity, not less, to transmit renewable
electric power [23, 24]. In contrast, building a network isolator can completely inhibit failure
spreading at increased connectivity. A perfect isolator can be realised with moderate effort
by reconstructing two substations in Norway, such that they effectively form two nodes
each. The new nodes must be linked by internal connections and one additional two-circuit
overhead line, whose parameters are optimised such that the condition rank(A12) = 1 is
satisfied (Fig. 3(c)). A simulation for such an optimised grid layout shows that the spreading
of the cascade is completely suppressed (Fig. 3(d)). The grid remains connected and load
shedding is no longer necessary as a containment strategy [2, 3].
Network isolators are not limited to the particular situation shown in Figure 1, or to linear
flow models only. In Figure 4(a,d) we identify several subgraphs that allow to easily introduce
network isolators into existing topologies. For subgraphs with a prior low connectivity, as
measured by a small vertex cut (Fig. 4(a)) or a small edge cut (Fig. 4(b,c,d)), network
isolators may be introduced with small grid modifications - by adding (a,b,d) or removing
and adding (c) selected links. The concept of network isolators has been established for
linear flow networks, but can be generalised in two ways. (1) We can rigorously proof the
existence of isolators for an important class of nonlinear network dynamical systems [26]. (2)
For many nonlinear systems of practical importance, the impact of failures or perturbations
is well described by a linearisation around an equilibrium or limit cycle [30]. We demonstrate
that the strong isolation of line outages in power grids persists beyond the linearised flow
equations via direct numerical simulations in Fig. 4(e to h).
In conclusion, connectivity determines the resilience of complex networks in manifold
ways. As expected, a division of a network into weakly coupled modules suppresses the
spreading of failures from one module to the others. Remarkably, we have found that a strong
inter-connection can equally well suppresses the spreading in both flow networks and in
networks of nonlinear dynamical systems. We have demonstrated that an even stronger effect
can be created by certain subgraphs called isolators, which inhibit the spreading completely.
Isolators can be applied to mitigate cascading failures, for instance in electric power grids,
while enabling an arbitrary degree of connectivity between the grid parts. These results
widen our perspective on the large scale organisation of complex networks in general, showing
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that very diverse structural patterns can exist that discriminate functional units and improve
network resilience.
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Supplemental Material
FLOW NETWORKS
In this section, we briefly review the theory and applications of linear flow networks.
Mathematical description
In this work, the main model of interest is a linear flow network model which we introduce
more formally in this section. Consider a connected graph G = (E, V ) consisting of N = |V |
nodes and L = |E| edges. Assign to each node in the network a potential ϑn ∈ R, n ∈ V (G)
and to each edge a capacity Kij ∈ R+, ` = (i, j) ∈ E(G). Now we assign a flow Fi→j ∈ R
to each link ` = (i, j) ∈ E(G) in the network that is assumed to be linear in the potential
drop
Fi→j = Kij · (ϑi − ϑj) = −Fj→i. (5)
Suppose that there are sources and sinks attached to the nodes of the networks Pi ∈ R, i ∈
V (G). In this case, the in- and outflows at each node have to balance with the sources and
sinks
Pi =
N∑
k=1
Fi→k. (6)
This equation is known as continuity equation or Kirchhoff’s current law. If the sources
and sinks Pi are given, Eqs. (6) and (5) completely determine the potentials in the network
(up to a constant shift to all potentials). In a power grid, the sources and sinks are the
power injections or withdrawals as a result of power production or consumption. When
looking at the stable, operational fixed point of a power grid they are balanced such that∑
i Pi = 0 – we therefore assume this to hold in the following sections. The theory of linear
flow networks applies resistor networks, as well as AC power grids in the DC approximation,
hydraulic networks and networks of limit cycle oscillators, which will be discussed in detail
in section .
Now we introduce a compact, vectorial notation which facilitates the analysis of pertur-
bations or damages to the network. Note that the flow is a signed quantity that depends
on the orientation of the edges that we arbitrarily fix for this purpose and say that the flow
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is directed from node i to node j in this case. We can write the flows in vectorial notation
~F = (F1, ..., FL)
> ∈ RL as follows;
~F = KI>~ϑ. (7)
Here, K = diag(K1, ..., KL) ∈ RL×L is the graph’s weight matrix that collects the edge
weights and I> is the transpose of the the graph’s edge-node incidence matrix I ∈ ZN×L
that determines the orientation of the graph’s edges by the following relationship
Ij` =

+1 if edge ` =ˆ (j, k) starts at node j,
−1 if edge ` =ˆ (j, k) ends at node j ,
0 otherwise.
(8)
Furthermore, ~ϑ = (ϑ1, ..., ϑN)
> ∈ RN is a vector of potentials or voltage phase angles. We
can also define a vector of power injections ~P = (P1, ..., PN)
> ∈ RN such that the continuity
equation reads as
~P = I ~F . (9)
In this expression, the correspondence between the power balance and Kirchhoff’s current
law becomes manifest: it states that the in- and outflows at each node have to balance
the injections and withdrawals of power. Combining Equations (7) and (9), we may find a
relationship between angles ~ϑ and power injections ~P , thus defining the graph’s weighted
Laplacian matrix L = IKI> ∈ RN×N , by
~P = IKI>~ϑ = L~ϑ. (10)
The weighted Laplacian matrix used here has the following entries
Lij =

−K` if i is connected to j via ` = (i, j),∑
`=(i,k)∈E(G)K` if i = j,
0 otherwise.
(11)
The Laplacian matrix plays an important role in graph theory [41]. If the underlying graph
G is connected, it has one zero eigenvalue λ1 = 0 with corresponding eigenvector ~v1 = ~1/
√
N .
Therefore, the matrix is not invertible. In many cases, it would nevertheless be desirable
to invert the matrix, e.g. in order to find the phase variables given the power injections in
Equation (10). This problem is typically overcome by making use of the matrix’s Moore-
Penrose pseudoinverse L†. It may be used to invert Equation (10) in the same way as for the
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ordinary matrix inverse in the case of balanced power injections [48]. The Moore-Penrose
pseudoinverse of the graph Laplacian L allows for the following representation: using L’s
eigenvalues sorted by magnitude λ1 = 0, λ2 ≤ ... ≤ λN with corresponding eigenvectors
~v1 = ~1/
√
N,~v2, ..., ~vN , we can express its pseudoinverse L
† as [43]
L† = (~v1, ~v2, ..., ~vN)

0 0 ... 0
0 λ−12 ... 0
... ... ... ...
... ... ... λ−1N
 (~v1, ~v2, ..., ~vN)> .
The second eigenvalue λ2 is usually referred to as Fiedler eigenvalue or algebraic connectivity
and is an indicator of the graph’s overall connectivity. If we assume the overall graph to be
connected, this eigenvalue is strictly greater than zero λ2 > 0. Importantly, a large difference
between second and third eigenvalue λ3 − λ2 implies a strong modularity in the graph and
thus indicates the existence of a community structure [16–18].
Before we proceed, let us briefly fix the notation for the following sections: we will refer
to an edge ` = (`1, `2) ∈ E(G) and its index ` in the ordered set of all edges interchangeably
or refer to it by its terminal nodes `1 and `2. If we assume the edge space to be spanned
by vectors in the two element field GF (2), we may express the edge by a unit vector ~l` =
(0, ..., 1︸︷︷︸
l
, ..0)> ∈ GF (2)L which we refer to as the edge’s indicator vector. The edge-node
incidence matrix I then maps this unit vector to the corresponding unit vectors in the field
of vertices GF (2)N . We thus get the following result for the edge expressed in terms of its
starting vertex `1 and terminal vertex `2:
~ν` = I ·~l` = ~e`1 − ~e`2 =

0
...
1
...
−1
...

}`1
}`2
,
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where ~e`1 and ~e`2 are basis vectors in GF (2)
N
~e`1 =

0
...
1
...
...
0

}`1
, ~e`2 =

0
...
...
1
...
0

}`2
.
This formulation allows us to easily switch between the edges expressed in edge space and
the nodes corresponding to its terminal ends.
Applicability of linear flow models
The theoretical framework in the last section has many different applications. We will
demonstrate its applicability to the following systems in this section:
1. Power grids, [31, 44]
2. Resistor networks [42],
3. Hydraulic networks [5, 28],
4. Limit cycle oscillators [30].
Application to power grids
The power flow equations describing the steady state of a power system at an arbitrary
node i are given by [44]
Pi =
N∑
k=1
|Vi||Vk|(Gik cos(ϑi − ϑk) +Bik sin(ϑi − ϑk))
Qi =
N∑
k=1
|Vi||Vk|(Gik sin(ϑi − ϑk)−Bik cos(ϑi − ϑk)).
(12)
Here, Pi and Qi are the real and reactive power generated or consumed at node or bus i,
ϑi is the voltage angle at the same bus and |Vi| is the voltage magnitude. The matrices
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G ∈ RN×N and B ∈ RN×N with elements Gij and Bij, respectively, are the real part and
the complex part of the complex nodal admittance matrix Y = G + iB ∈ CN×N . Note
that the matrices B and G are not actually matrices of susceptances and conductances,
respectively. Instead, their entries read as follows
Bij =

−bij if (i, j) ∈ E(G), i 6= j,
bshunti +
∑
(i,k)∈E(G) bik if i = j,
0 otherwise,
where bshunti denotes the shunt susceptance of node i and bij is the susceptance of the circuit
connecting node i to node j. G has an analogous structure with elements
Gij =

−gij if (i, j) ∈ E(G), i 6= j,
gshunti +
∑
(i,k)∈E(G) gik if i = j,
0 otherwise,
where gij are the conductances of the circuit between nodes i and node j. The matrices
B and G thus have the structure of a Laplacian matrix except for the diagonal entries
which contain additional terms given by the shunt susceptances and conductances. The
off-diagonal elements of the nodal admittance matrix thus read as
Yjk = −yjk, ∀j 6= k; yjk = gjk + ibjk = 1
rjk + ixjk
,
with the circuit’s reactance xjk and resistance rjk. Note that line susceptances b` =
−x
r2+x2
are thus negative. The Equations (12) reduce to the lossless power flow equations in the
case where the real part of the nodal admittance matrix is negligible G ≈ 0, i.e. lines are
purely inductive.
We will focus on the so called DC approximation of this full AC power flow equations.
This approximation is based on three assumptions [44]:
1. Voltages vary little, i.e., |Vi| ≈ const, ∀i with respect to their base values,
2. Angular differences are small, i.e., sin(ϑi − ϑj) ≈ ϑi − ϑj, ∀(i, j) ∈ E(G),
3. Transmission lines are purely inductive, i.e., Bij  Gij, ∀(i, j) ∈ E(G).
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Typically, these assumptions are fulfilled for high voltage transmission grids if the line loading
is not too large [27]. Using these approximation, Equation (12) reduces to
Pi =
N∑
k=1
|Vi||Vk|Bik︸ ︷︷ ︸
Kik
(ϑi − ϑk),
thus revealing the analogy to Equation (6).
Application to resistor networks
Resistor networks are another example which may be described using linear flow net-
works. They have been studied for a long time leading to many fundamental results of
graph theory [42]. We will briefly introduce the theory of resistor networks and use the sym-
bol =ˆ to refer to the corresponding quantity in the mathematical framework of linear flow
networks as introduced in section . For resistor networks, the flow along the graph’s edges
is a current flow ~i ∈ RL=ˆ~F between nodes of different voltage ~V ∈ RN=ˆ~ϑ. The line weights
are given by the inverse resistances, i.e. the conductances, of the lines G ∈ RL×L=ˆK such
that Equation (7) reads in this case
~i = GI>~V ,
where I is again the node-edge incidence matrix. Along the same lines, Equation (9) trans-
lates to
~iin = I~i.
Here, ~iin ∈ RN=ˆ~P is a vector of currents injected at the graphs’ nodes and the Equation is
again a manifestation of Kirchhoff’s current law. We may thus apply the same theoretical
framework to resistor networks.
Applications to hydraulic networks
The same formalism can also be shown to apply water transport networks that we refer
to as hydraulic networks or pipe networks. Consider a hydraulic network consisting of pipes
that connect to each other at junctions. Then we form the underlying graph by assigning a
vertex to each of the junctions and put an edge between two vertices if they are connected
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via a pipe. The nodal quantity of interest in this case is the pressure ~p ∈ RN=ˆ~ϑ. If we
assume the pipes to be much longer than their radius r  L and the flow across all pipes
in the network to be laminar with a Newtonian, incompressible fluid flowing through it, we
can approximate the fluid flow ~Q ∈ RL=ˆ~F across a pipe ` = (i, j) by the Hagen-Poiseuille
equation
Q` = K` · (pi − pj).
Here, we collected different parameters describing the pipe and the fluid in the line parameter
K` =
pir4`
8µL`
with the pipe radius r`, the pipe length L` and the fluid’s dynamic viscosity µ. Conservation
of mass then requires that inflows and outflows balance as in Equation (6). Important
applications of this framework are blood vessels in humans and animals [57], the vascular
system of plants [28] or hydraulic networks [56]. For vascular networks, the system does not
consist of pipes but rather of smaller vascular bundles such that the scaling of line parameter
K with the radius r4 does not necessarily exactly hold [29].
Applications to limit cycle oscillators
The linear flow model may be regarded as a linearisation of the Kuramoto model which
naturally appears in many cases, in particular when approximating weakly coupled oscillator
systems near a stable limit cycle [30].
Consider a connected, simple graph G = (E, V ). The Kuramoto model describes a set of
weakly coupled oscillators with phase angles ~ϑ ∈ RN attached to the graph’s vertices that are
coupled via the graph’s edges through coupling constants Kij, (i, j) ∈ E(G), see e.g.[55]. The
oscillators’ tendency to synchronise through the coupling is counteracted by each oscillator’s
natural frequency ωj that is written compactly as a vector ~ω = (ω1, ..., ωN)
> ∈ RN . Then
the dynamics of the phase angle ϑi attached to node i, i ∈ {1, ..., N}, reads
ϑ˙i = ωi −
∑
k
Kik sin(ϑi − ϑk).
As before, we fix an orientation of the graph’s edges and summarise the coupling coefficients
for all edges (i, j) ∈ E(G) in the diagonal coupling matrix K ∈ RL×L, such that the
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vectorised dynamics reads
~˙ϑ = ~ω − IK sin(I>~ϑ). (13)
Here, I is again the graph’s node-edge incidence matrix (8) and the sine function is under-
stood to be taken element-wise, i.e
sin(I>~ϑ) = (sin([I>~ϑ]1), ..., sin([I>~ϑ]L))>.
Fixed points of the dynamics are defined by a vanishing time derivative ~˙ϑ = ~0. Therefore,
the equation characterising the phase angles at the fixed point ~ϑ∗ reads
~ω = IK sin(I>~ϑ∗).
If the angular differences on all edges are small, we may reduce this to the linear equation
sin(I>~ϑ) ≈ I>~ϑ, again retrieving an expression analogous to the discrete Poisson equa-
tion (10).
The second-order Kuramoto model
An extension of the Kuramoto model presented in Equation (13) is given by the second-
order Kuramoto model that is also used frequently in power systems analysis to describe
synchronising generators [52–54], where it is also referred to as Kuramoto model with inertia.
The model contains an additional second-order time derivative of phase angles representing
the generators’ inertia and reads as
~¨ϑ = −α~˙ϑ+ ~ω − IK sin(I>~ϑ). (14)
Here, α = diag(α1, ..., αN) ∈ RN×N is a diagonal matrix incorporating the generators’ inertia
and friction coefficients [52] and the other quantities are defined the same way as for the
first order Kuramoto model (13). The vector of frequencies in this model corresponds to
the power injections ~ω ∈ RN=ˆ~P . Fixed points of the second order model with phase angles
~ϑ∗ are characterized by both, first and second order time derivative vanishing ~¨ϑ = ~˙ϑ = ~0
resulting in the same equation as for the first order model
~ω = IK sin(I>~ϑ∗).
Again, this model reduces to the linear flow model if phase differences at the fixed point are
small sin(I>~ϑ∗) ≈ I>~ϑ∗.
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Description of link failures
In this section, we will briefly review the analysis of link failures within the linear flow
theory setting. We will first demonstrate how the effects of a link failure may be approached
on the nodal level [31]. Assume that a link k = (r, s) with preoutage flow Fˆk fails, which
does not disconnect the graph. This induces a change in the potentials
~ϑ′ = ~ϑ+ ∆~ϑ
by virtue of the discrete Poisson equation (10). Here, we introduced the vector of potential
changes ∆~ϑ ∈ RN and a vector of potentials after the failure ~ϑ′ ∈ RN . The corresponding
equation for the new grid reads as
~P = (L+ ∆L)(~ϑ+ ∆~ϑ).
Here, ∆L is the change in the Laplacian matrix due to the removal of link k and takes the
form ∆L = KkI~lk(I~lk)
>. If we subtract the discrete Poisson equation for the old grid before
the failure of link k from this equation, we arrive at the expression
∆~ϑ = −(L+ ∆L)†∆L~ϑ.
Finally, we can use the Woodbury Matrix identity to rewrite the expression into the following
form [31]
L∆~ϑ = qk~νk, (15)
where
qk = (1−Kk(I ·~lk)>L†I ·~lk)−1Fˆk
is a source term. Similar expressions appear naturally when analysing resistor networks and
have been studied, for example, in Refs. [48, 51]. After calculating the potential changes
based on this equation, the flow changes on a link ` = (`1, `2) are given by the following
equation
∆F`1→`2 = K` · (∆ϑ`1 −∆ϑ`2).
NETWORK ISOLATORS INHIBIT FAILURE SPREADING COMPLETELY
In this section we formally establish the existence of network isolators. To this end we
first fix some notation.
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Fundamentals and notation
We consider a linear flow network consisting of two parts, i.e. its vertex set V is written
as V = V1 + V2. We now label the nodes in V as follows without loss of generality
1, . . . ,m1 : nodes in V1 that are connected to V2
m1 + 1, . . . , n1 : nodes in V1 that are not connected to V2
n1 + 1, . . . , n1 +m2 : nodes in V2 that are connected to V1
n1 +m2 + 1, . . . , n1 + n2 : nodes in V2 that are not connected to V1.
Then the weighted adjacency matrix of the network can be written as
A =
A1 A12
A>12 A2

A12 =
a 0
0 0

with A1 ∈ Rn1×n1 , A2 ∈ Rn2×n2 , A12 ∈ Rn1×n2 and a ∈ Rm1×m2 . Furthermore, we define
the degree matrices D1, D2 and d associated with the adjacency matrices A1, A2 and a,
that is
dkl =

∑
p akp for k = l
0 k 6= l
,
and the Laplacian matrices L1 = D1 −A1 of subnetwork 1, L2 = D2 −A2 of subnetwork
2 and L of the whole system.
Main theorem on network isolators
We can then formulate the main theorem on network isolators.
Theorem 2 (Network isolators completely suppress failure spreading between modules).
Consider a linear flow network consisting of two parts with vertex sets V1 and V2 and assume
that a single link in the induced subgraph G(V1) fails, i.e. a link (r, s) with r, s ∈ V1. If the
adjacency matrix of the mutual connections has unit rank rank(A12) = 1, then the flows on
all links in the induced subgraph G(V2) are not affected by the failure, that is
∆F`1,`2 ≡ 0 ∀`1, `2 ∈ V2.
The subgraph corresponding to the mutual interactions is referred to as network isolator.
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Proof. Assume that the adjacency matrix of the mutual connections has unit rank rank(A12) =
rank(a) = 1. We first proof that for any vector ~y ∈ Rn1 the following statement holds
~x =
d−1a 0
0 0
 ~y = c

1
...
1
0
...
0

, (16)
where c ∈ R is some real number. This result can be obtained by writing ~x ∈ Rn2 in
components. For all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m2} we have
xj =
∑
k ajkyk∑
k ajk
.
Since a has unit rank all its rows are linearly dependent such that we can write ajk/a1k =
aj1/a11 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n1}, such that ajk = a1kaj1/a11. Hence,
xj =
aj1/a11 ×
∑
k a1kyk
aj1/a11 ×
∑
k a1k
=
∑
k a1kyk∑
k a1k
= x1 =: c,
and all elements of the vector are equal. The remaining n2 − m2 elements of the vector
vanish, xj = 0, ∀j ∈ {m2 + 1, ..., n2}, because the corresponding adjacency matrix A12 has
only zero entries at the respective positions.
We now compute the impact of a failure of link k in G(V1) via the discrete Poisson
equation (15)
L∆~ϑ = qk~νk.
We decompose this equation as well as the vectors ∆~ϑ and ~ν into two parts corresponding
to the two parts of the network
∆~ϑ =
∆~ϑ1
∆~ϑ2
 , ~ν =
~ν1
~0
 ,
where ∆~ϑ1, ~ν1 ∈ Rn1 and ∆~ϑ2, ~ν2 ∈ Rn2 . Then the lower part of Equation (15) corresponding
to the vertices n1 + 1, . . . , n1 + n2 readsL2 +
d 0
0 0
∆~ϑ2 =
a 0
0 0
∆~ϑ1 (17)
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using the notation established above. Using the prior result (16) and multiplying by the
matrix d−1 0
0 1

this equation can be rewritten as
d−1 0
0 1
L2 +
1 0
0 0
∆~ϑ2 =
d−1a 0
0 0
∆~ϑ1 = c

1
...
1
0
...
0

Now one can easily check via a direct calculation that
∆~ϑ2 = c

1
...
1

is a solution to this equation. Furthermore, this solution is unique as the linear system of
equation has full rank. This is most easily seen for Equation (17), as the matrix on the left
hand side is normal and positive definite.
We have thus shown that the nodal potentials in V2 are shifted by the same constant c
when a link in G(V1) fails. Hence the flow changes are given by
∆F`1→`2 = K`(∆ϑ`1 −∆ϑ`2) = 0 ∀`1, `2 ∈ V2.
Corollary 1 (Complete bipartite graphs are network isolators). Consider a linear flow
network consisting of two modules with vertex sets V1 and V2 and assume that a single link
in the induced subgraph G(V1) fails, i.e. a link (r, s) with r, s ∈ V1. If the subgraph G′ of
mutual connections between the two modules is a complete bipartite graph with uniform edge
weights K = K` = Km, ∀`,m ∈ E(G′), then the subgraph is a network isolator. If the whole
graph is unweighted, G′ always has uniform edge weights, thus a complete bipartite graph of
mutual connections always is a network isolator for any unweighted network.
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Proof. If the subgraph G′ is complete and bipartite (ignoring all connections within both
induced subgraphs G(V1) and G(V2)), its adjacency matrix takes the form
A′ = K ·
 0 1m1×m2
1>m1×m2 0
 .
We can immediately see that this matrix has unit rank, such that by theorem 2, G′ is a
network isolator.
Network isolators in non-linear systems
We will now demonstrate how to extend the concepts of network isolators from linear
systems to a certain class of non-linear networked systems with diffusive coupling. Let
~f(L~x) = (f1([L~x]1), ..., fN([L~x]N))
> : ~x ∈ RN → ~f(L~x) ∈ RN
be a continuous function on the real numbers that depends on the product of Laplacian
matrix L and vector ~x. Here, [L~x]j denotes the j-th row of the standard matrix-vector
product L~x. We assume that the underlying network topology is again separated into two
subgraphs G(V1) and G(V2), see the beginning of this section. We further assume that
fj(0) = 0, ∀j ∈ {1, ...N},
i.e. each of the functions vanishes at the origin. Note that the functions fj([L~x]j) can be
different and non-linear, as long as they vanish at the origin. Consider a dynamical system
of the form
~˙x = ~f(L~x) (18)
that admits a fixed point solution ~x∗ with vanishing time derivative ~˙x = ~0 that fulfills
~0 = ~f(L~x∗). (19)
Now add a perturbation vector
∆~P =
∆~P1
~0
 (20)
to the system that has non-zero entries only at the nodes of the first induced subgraph G(V1)
and assume that the dynamical system 18 relaxes to a new fixed point ~x′ with
∆~P = ~f(L~x′). (21)
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Then the following corollary holds
Corollary 2 (Isolation in non-linear systems). Consider a non-linear dynamical networked
system of the form (18) that consists of two modules with vertex sets V1 and V2 which are
connected by a network isolator as of Theorem 2. Assume that the system admits a fixed
point solution as given in Eq. 19. Assume that a small perturbation as in Eq. 20 is applied
to the nodes in the first induced subgraph G(V1) and that the system relaxes to a new fixed
point as in Eq. 21. Then the new fixed point has the following form
~x′ =
 ~x′1
c~12
 ,
where c ∈ R is a constant.
The second module is thus isolated against perturbations in the first module and vice
versa in the sense that a perturbation in one module results in a constant shift in the other
module.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of theorem 2. Applying the function ~f to Equa-
tion 17 describing the fixed point in the non-perturbed subgraph G(V2), we see that the
system is still solved by
~x′ =
∆~x′1
c~12
 .
Approximate isolation for weakly non-linear systems
Even if not rigorously valid, we find that strong network isolation persists for an even
larger class of non-linear systems that we will discuss in this section. Note that our analysis
here closely follows a linear response theory analysis of Kuramoto oscillators that can be
found in Ref. [30].
Consider a networked non-linear dynamical system of the form
~˙xi = ~f(~xi)i +
N∑
k=1
Aikg(xi − xk). (22)
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Here, ~x ∈ RN is a vector of nodal dynamical variables, ~f is a differentiable function of self-
interactions of these variables and ~g(~x) is a differentiable function that depends only on the
differences of nodal variables at neighbouring nodes. The strength of interactions is encoded
in the graph’s adjacency matrix A. Assume that the system relaxes to a fixed point with
~˙xi = 0 where ~x(t) = ~x
∗. If we perturb the network locally at a node or an edge, we can
compute the change in this fixed point using linear response theory [30]: to leading order,
we obtain a linear system as above.
Assume that we perturb a single edge (n,m) by modifying its edge weight by a small number
∆Aij such that
Aij → A′ij = Aij + ∆Aij
∆Aij =
0 if (i, j) 6= (n,m)∆A if (i, j) = (n,m) .
Assume that this modification causes a change of the fixed point by
x∗j → x′j = x∗j + ∆xj, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., N}.
We can expand the dynamics to leading order in terms of the new fixed point
∂f(x∗j)
∂xj
∆xj +
N∑
k=1
Ajk
∂g(x∗j − x∗k)
∂xj
(∆xj −∆xk) + sj = 0.
Here, sj is a source term that vanishes if node j is not part of the edge (n,m), j 6= n,m. The
sum in this expression may be compactly written in terms of an effective Laplacian matrix
L˜
N∑
k=1
Ajk
∂g(x∗j − x∗k)
∂xj
(∆xj −∆xk) = [L˜∆~x]j,
where the Laplacian matrix has the off-diagonal entries
L˜jk = −Ajk
∂g(x∗j − x∗k)
∂xj
.
Thus, if the underlying graph contains a network isolator, we can apply Theorem 2 to the
system and see immediately that each component is (approximately) isolated against small
perturbations in the other one. In particular, this description applies to Kuramoto oscillators
(see section ) perturbed at a few nodes or edges and powergrids described by AC load flow
equations 12 subject to a link failure. We can thus get approximate isolation in both models
as shown in Figure 4(e to h) for the AC load flow model.
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LINEAR CONTROLLABILITY OF COMPLEX NETWORKS
We now turn to a different theoretical concept in complex networks research: the con-
trollability of a network. In this section, we briefly analyse the influence of network isolators
on the controllabilty of complex systems with a linear dynamics. In general, we find that
introducing a network isolator to a complex network has no generic influence on its control-
lability.
Consider a linear dynamical system on a network with N nodes with a state vector ~x ∈ RN
whose dynamics is given by [47]
~˙x = A~x+B~u. (23)
Here, A ∈ RN×N denotes the graph’s adjacency matrix, ~u ∈ Rm is a (potentially time-
varying) input vector that is supposed to achieve control of the network and B ∈ RN×m is
the control matrix. Then one definition of controllability is the following: Can we find a set
of m driver nodes identified by the controllability matrix B such that the system may be
driven from any initial state ~x0 to any final state ~xf in finite time? If yes, the system is said
to be controllable and a measure of its controllability is given by the minimum number of
driving nodes Nd ≤ N necessary to achieve full controllability [47, 49, 50].
We identify this set of driver nodes necessary for exact controllability for a small sample
network using a method due to Yuan et al. [47] who demonstrated that the minimum number
of driver nodes Nd can be found by determining the multiplicity of the eigenvalues of the
graph’s adjacency matrix A [47]. Assume that the underlying network is undirected such
that its adjacency matrix is symmetric as for the networks studied in this manuscript. In
this case, we can calculate the algebraic multiplicity δ(λi) for all eigenvalues λi of this matrix
to calculate the minimum number of driver nodes, ND, necessary to control the network (cf.
Eq.4, Ref. [47])
ND = maxi [δ(λi)] . (24)
This approach has the advantage that the driver nodes necessary to control the network, i.e.
the controllability of a network, may immediately be identified, which is more complicated
when using the classical Kalman rank condition [47].
In Figure S8, we illustrate a potential application of this formalism to network isolators.
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The adjacency matrix of the graph reported in panel A has the eigenvalue λM = −1 with
multiplicity δ(λM) = 2, while all other eigenvalues have multiplicity one. An eigenvalue
λM = −1 in the adjacency matrix can easily be constructed by connecting two nodes to
the other nodes in a network in exactly the same way [48]. Thus, by the criterion 24,
only two nodes are required to control the network. These nodes have been determined
using the method described in Ref. [47] and are highlighted in orange. After introducing
the isolator into the system (panel D), the maximum multiplicity of any eigenvalue of the
graph’s adjacency matrix is one, i.e. δ(λi) = 1, ∀i, which implies that the graph can be
controlled by a single node (colored red). Therefore, in this case, the controllability of the
network is increased after constructing the isolator. We emphasize that the network isolator
prevents only flow changes, but not flows from passing as demonstrated in panels B-C and
E-F.
For the remaining network isolators constructed in throughout this manuscript, we did
not find any influence of the introduction of network isolators on the controllability of the
underlying network and thus conclude that isolators do not generically influence network
controllability.
COMPUTATIONAL METHODS
Creating graphs with strong or weak inter-module connectivity
We introduce a model to create ensembles of graphs consisting of two subgraphs with
weak or strong interconnectvity, see Figures 1 and 2. We start with two disconnected Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi random graphs G1(N1, p1) and G2(N2, p2), where N denotes the number of nodes in
the grid and p the probability that two randomly chosen nodes are connected by an edge
[35]. Then we randomly choose n1 = [c ·N1] nodes v = {v1, ..., vn1} in G1 and n2 = [c ·N2]
nodes w = {w1, ..., wn2} in G2. Here, c ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ R is a constant representing the share
of nodes connecting to the other subgraph and [·] denotes the nearest integer. Out of all
possible edges e = {(v1, w1), ..., (vn1 , w1), ..., (vn1 , wn2)} between the two sets of nodes v and
w, we randomly add a share of µ ∈ [0, 1]. The parameter µ controls the connectivity of the
two subgraphs G1 and G2: They remain disconnected for µ = 0 and they are connected
via a complete bipartite graph for for µ = 1. For c = 1 and µ = p1 = p2 we recover a
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single Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph with N = N1 + N2 nodes. Note that this procedure is in
principal not limited to ER random graphs. We apply it to study other types of graphs as
shown in Supplemental Figure S1.
Perturbing network isolators
The robustness of network isolators to structural perturbations is analysed as follows.
Let G = (E, V ) be a graph whose nodes are split into two subsets V1 and V2. Furthermore,
let A12 be the part of the graph’s weighted adjacency matrix that encodes the mutual
connections between the two parts as described in theorem 2. Without loss of generality we
can order the nodes of the network in such a way that the matrix has the structure
A12 =
~a1 · · · ~am ~0 · · · ~0
~0 · · · ~0 ~0 · · · ~0
 . (25)
According to theorem 2, a perfect network isolator is found if rank(A12) = 1, i.e. if all vectors
~a1, . . . ,~am are linearly dependent.
To investigate the robustness of network isolators, we start from a unit rank matrix
rank(A12) = 1 and perturb it iteratively. In each step we choose one of the vectors ~ai, i =
1, . . . ,m at random and perturb it according to ~a′i = ~ai + ~e‖~ai‖. The elements of the
perturbation vector ~e are chosen uniformly at random from the interval [−β, β], where β is
a small parameter, here β = 0.05.
The deviation of the perturbed matrix A12 from a unit rank matrix is quantified using
its coherence statistics [39],
ξ(A12) = 1−min
i,j
〈~ai,~aj〉
‖~ai‖‖~aj‖ , (26)
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the standard scalar product on Rn and ‖·‖ denotes the `2-norm. For a
matrix A12 of unit rank we have ξ(A12) = 0 as all vectors are linearly dependent. For vectors
deviating from linear dependence, the measure increases until it reaches its maximum value
if two vectors are linearly independent with ξ(A12) = 1.
To create Figure 2(e), we repeated this process 1000 times starting from the perfect
isolator shown in panel c. Edge weights were randomly chosen from a normal distribution
N (10, 1) with mean µ = 10 and variance σ2 = 1 except for the isolator, where we choose
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four groups of four edges having the same weight such that initially rank(A12) = 1. For each
perturbed network, we evaluate ξ(A12) and the ratio of flow changes R according to Eq. (3)
averaged over all possible trigger links ` and distances d. For a perfect isolator, this ratio
vanishes due to a vanishing numerator.
Power grid data and cascade model
Power grid data has been extracted from the open European energy system model PyPSA-
Eur, which is fully available online [19]. The model includes the topology as well as the
susceptance b` and the line rating F
max
i→j for each high voltage transmission line in Europe.
We consider the Scandinavian synchronous grid spanning Norway, Sweden, Finland and
parts of Denmark. This grid is coupled to other synchronous grids (central European grid,
British grid and Baltic grid) only via high voltage DC transmission lines. Power flow on these
lines are actively controlled and can thus be considered constant, thus leading to constant
real power injections at the coupling nodes. The Scandinavian grid has 269 nodes and 370
edges, counting multiple-circuit lines only once.
Cascading failures are simulated for fixed power injections Pi for each node corresponding
to an economic dispatch for the entire PyPSA-Eur model that includes a security margin
given by the constraint |Fi→j| ≤ 0.8 · Fmaxi→j . The cascade is triggered by the failure of a
single line (r, s) which is effectively removed from the grid. The simulation then proceeds
step-wise; In each step, we first calculate the nodal phase angles ϑi and real power flows
Fi→j for all nodes and lines, respectively, by solving the continuity equation Pi =
∑
j Fi→j
with Fi→j = Kij(ϑi − ϑj). Then we check for overloads: Any line (i, j) with |Fi→j| > Fmaxi→j
undergoes an emergency shutdown and is removed from the grid. The simulations are
stopped when no further overload occurs or when the grid is disconnected.
Note that this mechanism for cascading failures is different from the cascading failure
mechanism typically analysed in node capacity load models (see e.g. Refs. [45, 46]). The
redistribution of nodal loads or flows after failures in such models is typically based on
neighborhood of nodes, on shortest path betweenness measures or on other ‘intelligent’ re-
distribution schemes whereas the redistribution of flows after failures in linear flow networks
or power grids studied using AC load flow analysis are given by the physical laws governing
electrical networks. Furthermore, usually nodes - not edges - are assumed to fail, which is
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not the typical case in real power grids.
Processing leaf data
The leaf venation network is based on a microscopic recording of a leaf of the species
Bursera hollickii provided by the authors of Ref. [20]. Edge weights Kij are assumed to
scale with the radius rij of the corresponding vein (i, j) as Kij ∝ r4ij according to the Hagen-
Poisseuille law, see Ref. [29] for a detailed discussion. We used the radius in pixel scanned
at a resolution of 6400 dpi.
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Figure S1. Averaged ratio of flow changes decays with high and low connectivity
for different random graphs. All panels show ratio of flow changes R averaged over all links
and distances against connectivity parameter µ (see methods) along with corresponding graph for
low values of the connectivity parameter. (a) Two ER graphs with parameters Ni = 50, pi = 0.3
connected with probability µ = 0.02 at a randomly chosen share of c = 0.2 their nodes. (b) Same
as in (A), but with parameters Ni = 30, pi = 0.4, µ = 0.03, c = 0.2. (c) A similar scaling is
observed if two BA random graphs with parameters Ni = 40, ki = 4 are connected with probability
µ = 0.016 at a randomly chosen share of c = 0.2 their nodes. (d) The scaling is also preserved if
two 4-regular, random graphs are connected with parameters N = 50, µ = 0.01, c = 0.2. Blue line
represents median value over all distances and shaded region indicates 0.25- and 0.75-quantiles for
all graphs.
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Figure S2. Ratio of flow changes depends weakly on distance. We examine the scaling
of link flow changes with distance for two ER random graphs G(120, 0.02) that are connected at
c = 0.2 nodes with changing probabilities µ = 0.02 (left), µ = 0.3 (centre) and µ = 0.9 (right).
We only consider the largest component from each of the two random graphs and remove all dead
ends as they result in vanishing flow changes. (a to c) Normalised absolute flow changes decay
with distance when averaging over all possible trigger links. We always assume a unit flow on the
failing link before the failure. We distinguish flow changes in the same (blue, top) and the other
(purple, bottom) module of the graph. Flow changes are consistently higher in the same module
for all distances. (d to f) Ratio of flow changes averaged over all possible trigger links R(d) reveals
a weak dependence of the ratio on distance. Blue line represents median value over all distances
and shaded region indicates 0.25- and 0.75-quantiles for all graphs.
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Figure S3. Increasing or decreasing connectivity between more than two modules
reduces failure spreading equally well. Here, we demonstrate a possible extension of the
synthetic network model described in the Methods section to more than two modules. For each
panel, we simulate a single link failure (red) that results in flow changes (colour coded). (a to c)
Three ER random graphs G(30, 0.3) (right), G(50, 0.2) (bottom) and G(40, 0.4) (top left) that are
mutually interconnected with probability µ = 0.05 at 20 percent, i.e. c = 0.2, thus resulting in
three mutually weakly connected modules. (d to f) Connecting the same modules as shown in (A
to C) with probability µ = 0.85, thus resulting in strong inter-module connectivity, reduces failure
spreading equally well.
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Figure S4. Networks isolators can be generalised to network consisting of more than
two modules. (a) Topology of a network consisting of three ER random graphs G(40, 0.4) (left),
G(20, 0.3) (top) and G(30, 0.2) (bottom right) that are mutually connected through network iso-
lators. (b to d) Link failures in each of the individual subgraphs (red lines) do not change flows
(colour code) in any of the other subgraphs.
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Figure S5. Robustness of network isolators shows the same scaling with perturbations
for different graphs. Robustness of network isolators measured by ratio of flow changes R
averaged over all links against measure of perturbations to network isolators ξ(A1,2). (a) Graph
created from the graph ensemble and shown in Fig. S1C was modified in such a way that it contains
a network isolator connecting five nodes from one part to five nodes of the other part through
a bipartite connectivity structure. Edge weights are drawn randomly from a normal distribution
N (10, 1) except for the network isolator where the randomly chosen weights of five edges starting in
the same node and connecting to all connecting nodes in the other part were chosen as basis weights
for all other connections between the two parts. (b) The isolator robustness shows qualtiatively
the same scaling as for the 6-regular graph shown in Fig. 1(c). Perturbations were applied in 1000
repetitions choosing a perturbation strength of α = 0.05. Dotted line takes into account the fact
that the curve goes through the point ξ = R = 0 for a perfect isolator.
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Figure S6. Network isolators do not increase grid vulnerability. (a) Failure of a link
with unit flow in the Scandinavian grid before the construction of the network isolator yields a
strong response in terms of absolute flow changes |∆F |. (b) After adding two links to create a
network isolator (blue shaded region, see Figure 3(c)), we simulate a failure of one of the links in
the isolator. We observe that both, the failure within the isolator (b) as well as a failure in the
initial grid in close proximity to the location where the isolator is constructed (a) yield a similar
effect. We thus conclude that introducing the network isolator will not make the network more
vulnerable compared to the network without the isolator. However, a failure in the isolator may
potentially affect the whole network.
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Figure S7. Network isolators may be realised in various real-world power grids. All
grid topologies and line susceptances were extracted from the open European energy system model
PyPSA-Eur, which is fully available online[19]. (a,c,e) Initial failure of a link (red) with unit flow
results in flow changes in the whole network for Scandinavia (a,c) as well as the central European
grid (e). (b,d,f) After introducing network isolators to the grids, failure spreading to other parts
of the network is completely stopped. The construction of isolators follows the “recipes” illustrated
in Figure 4, namely with (b) following the construction in Fig. 4(b), (d) following the construction
in Fig. 4(a), and (f) following the construction in Fig. 4(d).
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Figure S8. Isolators do not generally prevent the controllability of a network. (a) An
example of an undirected network with two weakly connected components that requires ND = 2
driving nodes (in orange) to be controlled. This can be calculated from the graph adjacency matrix,
which has, by construction, an eigenvalue λM = −1 with algebraic multiplicity δ(λM ) = 2 (See
Eq. 24 and Ref. [47]). (d) After adding a few links to create a network isolator, we have ND = 1 and
only one node (colored orange) is necessary to control the entire network, i.e. the network isolator
has in this case increased the controllability of the network. (b) We show the flows obtained by
our linear flow model for a single source of power P = 1 at the node colored in red and a single
sink with P = −1 at the node colored in blue. The resulting (absolute) flows are color-coded:
The flow can easily reach from the red node to the blue node. (e) Adding the isolator, flow can
still propagate freely from the source node (red) to the target node (blue) in the same way as in
panel B. Hence, the isolator does not prevent the propagation of flows. (c) Simulating the failure
of a single link (red), we observe that flows do also change in the other part of the network. (f)
Conversely, the isolator does prevent propagation of flow changes caused by a link failure in the
right part of the network to its left part.
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